APPRAISING THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE SUBJECTS AND OBJECTS
OF THE CONSTITUTION: A CASE STUDY IN TEXTUAL AND
HISTORICAL REVISIONISM
*

Richard H. Fallon, Jr.

A recurrent challenge in modern constitutional law takes the following form: a scholar produces a novel interpretation of the United
States Constitution, based on creative textual analysis or original historical research, and calls for a corresponding revision of constitutional doctrine based on his or her insight. How should other law
professors, and especially judges and Supreme Court Justices, respond? Insofar as the novel and arresting thesis depends on claims of
historical fact, historically minded scholars will want to look carefully
at the supporting evidence and otherwise test it. Sometimes even initial scrutiny will expose the claims as transparently unsupportable.
Perhaps more frequently, work by others will reveal grounds for uncertainty, but leave the new theory among a set of more or less plausible competitors. None will be decisively proven, but all will retain a
claim to be taken seriously. Then, with the ultimate truth of the textual or historical claim in a state of greater or lesser certainty, courts
will need to decide how much, if at all, to rely on it.
1
In his splendidly iconoclastic articles The Subjects of the Constitution
2
and The Objects of the Constitution, Nicholas Rosenkranz draws attention to a feature of the Constitution’s language and structure—
involving the juxtaposition of provisions written in the passive voice
with others that speak in the active voice and have clear subjects—
that nearly everyone else, including constitutional experts, had previously overlooked. Having done so, he advances a spectacularly creative argument that according due significance to the subjects and objects of diverse constitutional provisions would not only have
significant substantive implications, but also force an even more pro3
foundly important restructuring of constitutional litigation. For
*
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Ralph S. Tyler, Jr. Professor of Constitutional Law, Harvard Law School. I am grateful to
Dan Meltzer for insightful comments on an earlier draft and to Charlie Griffin for extraordinarily helpful research assistance.
Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, The Subjects of the Constitution, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1209 (2010).
Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, The Objects of the Constitution, 63 STAN. L. REV. 1005 (2011).
See Rosenkranz, supra note 1, at 1210–11 (promising a “new model of judicial review”).
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both scholars and judges, coming to terms with Rosenkranz’s theory
is now an important agenda item.
In this short Article, I shall express some grounds for respectful
skepticism, both about whether Rosenkranz has proven his claims
and about whether courts should decide cases on the basis of his arguments, even if judges thought him more likely right than not about
the significance that well-informed Americans of the Founding generation would have attached to the “subjects” and “objects” of the
Constitution. But, I also hope to train attention on the general
methodological challenge—partly for other law professors working in
the field and especially for judges and Justices—that work such as
Rosenkranz’s poses: How should we appraise, and what significance
should we attach to, ingenious, provocatively novel theses that would
make constitutional outcomes depend wholly on seemingly plausible,
but not clearly proven linguistic and historical claims?
I. PROFESSOR ROSENKRANZ’S INFERENCES FROM THE CONSTITUTION’S
SUBJECTS AND OBJECTS
According to Professor Rosenkranz, the Constitution’s text and
structure clearly establish that the most fundamental question in any
constitutional case is always who has violated—or is capable of violat4
5
ing—the particular provision in question. When “the who question”
is framed, it will sometimes have obvious answers, especially in cases
involving the powers of and the restrictions applying to the federal
government. The answer will be unmistakable when a provision is
written in the active voice, as is the First Amendment, which says,
“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion,
or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of
6
speech, or of the press.” The Commerce Clause also has “Congress”
7
8
as its subject, as does Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Similarly, many of the provisions of Article II have “the President” as
their subject. A number of clauses in Article III, which confers judicial power, are also written in the active voice.
By contrast, many other constitutional guarantees—especially including the provisions of the Bill of Rights other than the First
4
5
6
7
8

Rosenkranz, supra note 2, at 1006; Rosenkranz, supra note 1, at 1210.
Rosenkranz, supra note 1, at 1210.
U.S. CONST. amend. I (emphasis added).
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (“The Congress shall have Power . . . [t]o regulate Commerce
with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes . . . .”).
U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 5 (“The Congress shall have the power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.”).
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Amendment—are written in the passive voice. When a provision is
written in the passive voice, Rosenkranz maintains that we need to
9
figure out who is its “object.” For example, to whom does the Fourth
Amendment apply or whom does it restrain? In nearly every case, he
says, the answer to questions about the “objects” of constitutional re10
straints can be discerned from the Constitution’s structure. For example, because only the Executive can effect a search and seizure, the
answer to the Fourth Amendment “who question” involving searches
11
and seizures is “the President.” With regard to a variety of procedural guarantees in Amendments V through VII—such as, rights to
trial by jury and the assistance of counsel—Rosenkranz infers that it is
12
the courts who are bound.
When we move from constitutional restrictions on the federal
government to constitutional restrictions on the states, Rosenkranz
13
acknowledges that answering “the who question” can be trickier.
The difficulty largely comes from the partial “incorporation” of the
Bill of Rights that he believes occurred through the Privileges or Im14
munities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. It takes careful historical work to determine which provisions are and are not incorporated, and which were redefined in the process. But once these issues
are resolved, constitutional grammar again dictates a good deal, he
argues. The Privileges or Immunities Clause says, “No state shall make
or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of
15
citizens of the United States.” Perhaps most often, all three branches of state governments will apparently be bound as either potential
9
10
11
12
13
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Rosenkranz, supra note 2, at 1010.
Id. at 1027.
Rosenkranz, supra note 2, at 1034–35; Rosenkranz, supra note 1, at 1241.
Rosenkranz, supra note 2, at 1046–50.
See id. at 1024 (“It may be tempting to say that all of these clauses apply to all three
branches of state government, because they say only ‘No State shall.’ But textual analysis
does not end there. Structural logic might demonstrate that some such clauses are limited to only one or two branches of state government.” (footnote omitted)).
See Rosenkranz, supra note 2, at 1054–55 (following Akhil Amar in arguing that the Privileges or Immunities Clause incorporates “the individual-rights aspects of the Bill of
Rights” but not its structural aspects). Contrary to what Rosenkranz believes the Constitution’s text and history require, the modern Supreme Court has incorporated the Bill of
Rights against the states using the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Nevertheless, he is not alone in believing that the Privileges or Immunities Clause may be
the more historically plausible source of incorporation doctrine. See, e.g., McDonald v.
City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3063–83 (2010) (Thomas, J., concurring) (presenting
exhaustive historical evidence supporting incorporation through the Privileges or Immunities Clause, not the Due Process Clause); AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S UNWRITTEN
CONSTITUTION: THE PRECEDENTS AND PRINCIPLES WE LIVE BY 118–21, 156–63 (2012)
(making a similar argument).
U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 1 (emphasis added).
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makers or enforcers of laws that abridge the privileges or immunities
16
of citizens (including, for example, the freedom of speech).
According to Rosenkranz, careful attention to “the who question”
would dictate important changes in the substance of constitutional
law. For example, because Congress is the subject of the First
Amendment, Rosenkranz concludes that action by the President
cannot violate the Free Speech, Free Exercise, or Establishment
17
Clauses. And because he believes that nearly all of the Bill of Rights
guarantees that are written in the passive voice have the President or
the courts, not Congress, as their objects, he argues that no law that
Congress might pass could possibly violate most provisions of the Bill
18
of Rights.
As startling as the implications of his thesis would be for substantive constitutional doctrine, Rosenkranz thinks his conclusions have
even more revolutionary implications for the structure of constitutional litigation and, in particular, for currently vexed issues about
the availability of facial and as-applied challenges. According to
Rosenkranz, the answer to “the who question” determines whether a
19
constitutional challenge is facial or as applied. A challenge brought
under a constitutional provision that has “Congress” as its subject is
inherently facial, Rosenkranz argues, because if Congress oversteps its
powers, then it necessarily does so at the moment when it legislates,
20
with the effect that it failed to produce any valid law at all. A court
16

17

18
19

20

See Rosenkranz, supra note 2, at 1057 (“[T]he Framers [of the Fourteenth Amendment]
could not be certain precisely who, at the state level, would pose each sort of threat to liberty. Therefore, the Constitution never expressly singles out branches of state government when limiting state power; instead, it says either ‘No State shall’ or ‘by any State.’”
(footnotes omitted)).
See Rosenkranz, supra note 1, at 1261 (“[T]he executive branch cannot violate the Establishment Clause on the merits—for the simple reason that the executive branch is not the subject
of the First Amendment.”).
Rosenkranz, supra note 2, at 1050–51.
Believing that constitutional challenges are necessarily challenges to actions by particular
actors, rather than to statutes, Rosenkranz initially mocks the doctrine that attempts to
sort challenges to statutes into distinctive categories of “facial” and “as-applied.” See
Rosenkranz, supra note 1, at 1229–30 (“[T]he terms themselves are misleading malapropisms.”). It swiftly turns out, however, that he believes his theory will give rigorous content
to those currently disordered categories by determining which constitutional challenges
are necessarily facial—in the sense of framing the question whether Congress successfully
enacted any law at all, id. at 1238—and which cannot be facial because they arise under
constitutional provisions that restrain the President or the courts, not Congress. Id. at
1241–42; see Rosenkranz, supra note 2, at 1007, 1050–51 (explaining that a challenge to
legislative action is a facial challenge, whereas a challenge to an executive action is an asapplied challenge).
Rosenkranz, supra note 1, at 1238 (“If Congress has violated the Constitution by making
an impermissible law, then it has violated the Constitution at the moment of making the
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confronted with a proper First Amendment challenge must therefore
determine whether a challenged act of Congress either falls or stands
in its entirety.
In constitutional litigation under provisions that have the President or the judiciary as their subject or object, the structure of constitutional litigation is necessarily wholly different, Rosenkranz maintains. According to him, the idea of facial challenges under such
21
provisions is nonsensical. If a provision limits the powers of the
President or the courts, rather than Congress, then a constitutional
challenge under that provision must necessarily address the action of
the President or a court. To be sure, the President or a court might
sometimes act to enforce a law that a provision of the Bill of Rights
forbids the President or a court to enforce. For example, the President or a court might follow a congressional directive to impose cruel
or unusual punishments. Even in such a case, however, Rosenkranz
argues that a challenge is necessarily to the actual or anticipated presidential or judicial action in applying the statute, which is of course to
say that the challenge, to the extent it involves a statute at all, can on22
ly be to a statute as-applied. It cannot be a facial one.
Once again, matters are more complicated in the case of challenges to actions by state officials because the crucial language of the
Fourteenth Amendment forbids states to “make or enforce any law”
that infringes the rights that the Amendment guarantees. If I understand correctly, Rosenkranz thus believes that at least some state legislation can violate incorporated provisions of the Bill of Rights and be
vulnerable to challenges on its face, even if substantively identical
23
federal legislation would not. The key distinction is that the Fourteenth Amendment forbids state legislators to “make,” as well as state
executives or judiciaries to “enforce,” laws, and it therefore becomes
possible for state legislatures to violate the “incorporated” Fourth or
24
Eighth Amendment, for example, even though Congress could not

21
22
23

24

law. And so, it must be possible to identify a constitutional flaw on the face of the statute
itself. Thus, a ‘facial challenge’ is nothing more nor less than a claim that Congress (or a state legislature) has violated the Constitution.”).
Id. at 1238–42.
Id.
See Rosenkranz, supra note 2, at 1066–67 (“[T]he Privileges or Immunities Clause begins
‘No State shall.’ So the privilege against state takings may run against state legislatures, as
well as state executives, and it may forbid regulatory takings as well as physical takings.”).
For whatever reason, Rosenkranz’s discussion of incorporation in Objects passes over most
of the provisions of the Bill of Rights that are written in the passive voice.
I do not exclude the possibility that I might be mistaken in my account of the implications of Rosenkranz’s theory for Fourth or Eighth Amendment litigation, as he does not
specifically discuss this subject. It seems clear, however, that in his view the language of
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violate the original Fourth or Eighth Amendments (because they
have the President or the courts as their objects).
II. METHODOLOGICAL ASSUMPTIONS
Rosenkranz’s thesis about the implications of the “subjects” and
“objects” of the Constitution is original, ingenious, and bracing. A
fair appraisal requires excavating beneath his substantive claims to
identify his methodological assumptions. As is evident on the surface, Rosenkranz’s methodology is resolutely textualist. Constitutional law is in a state of confusion, he writes, and the confusion, “like
most confusion in law, stems from insufficient attention to text. Individual words are important, of course, but equally important is textual structure. . . . [C]areful attention to constitutional grammar can
reveal—and will reveal—nothing less than the constitutional struc25
ture of judicial review.” When the Constitution’s text speaks clearly,
Rosenkranz generally looks no further in attempting to support his
conclusions. If uncertainty would otherwise exist—for example,
about who are the objects of constitutional provisions written in the
passive voice—he refers to constitutional structure to find resolu26
tion.
Appeals to the Constitution’s text and structure are by no means
27
unusual or even controversial in constitutional law. But Rosenkranz
appears to go further than most in claiming that the Constitution’s
text and structure almost uniquely determine constitutional outcomes. Albeit with some trepidation, I think it fair to conclude that
his argument rests upon three methodological assumptions, each of
which will provide a useful point of departure for inquiry into the
persuasiveness of his conclusions.
First, Rosenkranz assumes that the appropriate “structure of judicial review”—including the availability of facial challenges—flows directly, nearly as a matter of entailment, from the meaning of constitutional provisions conferring and limiting the powers of Congress, the

25
26
27

the Fourteenth Amendment requires a different set of rules governing facial challenges
to state action than the language of Article I and the Bill of Rights makes appropriate in
challenges to action by the federal government.
Rosenkranz, supra note 1, at 1210.
See, e.g., Rosenkranz, supra note 2, at 1016 (“As Marshall demonstrated, the subjects of the
active-voice clauses can help identify the implicit objects of the passive-voice clauses.”).
See, e.g., PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION 84–85
(1982) (listing such “textual” and “historical” arguments among the recognized modalities of constitutional argument); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., A Constructivist Coherence Theory of
Constitutional Interpretation, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1189, 1195–98, 1200–01 (1987) (discussing
arguments from the Constitution’s text and structure).
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President, the courts, and the states. On an alternative view, constitutional adjudication properly derives its structure, at least partly, from
traditions and doctrines that have more to do with constitutional
28
“implementation” than with textual “meaning.” In my view, an apt
illustration comes from the “severability” doctrine, under which the
courts, when confronting a statute with some unconstitutional parts
or applications, will sometimes determine that even if a statute is invalid in part, the valid parts can be separated and remain valid, judicial29
ly enforceable law. Another example comes from the “strict scrutiny” test, under which courts will invalidate legislation that infringes
on fundamental rights, unless the statutory restriction is “necessary”
30
or “narrowly tailored” to a “compelling governmental interest.” No
provision of the Constitution includes any such language. No one
has ever traced the strict scrutiny test to the original understanding of
any constitutional guarantee. The Supreme Court essentially invent31
ed the formula in a series of cases decided during the 1960s. Yet the
28

29

30

31

RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., IMPLEMENTING THE CONSTITUTION 37–42 (2001); Richard H.
Fallon, Jr., Judicially Manageable Standards and Constitutional Meaning, 119 HARV. L. REV.
1275, 1276, 1281–85 (2006). Some originalists embrace an analogous distinction between
the constitutional meaning that emerges from interpretation, which may sometimes be
only vague or abstract, and the “construction” that courts permissibly engage in when
they create doctrinal tests to enforce or apply partially indeterminate language. See, e.g.,
RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY
118 (2004) (“Although both constitutional legitimacy and the commitment to a written
constitution necessitate reliance upon the original meaning of the text, originalist interpretation has its limits—limits that inhere in the use of language to guide conduct.”);
KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION: DIVIDED POWERS AND
CONSTITUTIONAL MEANING 7 (1999) (“When political actors systematically make such arguments with little regard for balancing such textual components, it makes more sense to
recognize that they are engaged in a different activity than to accuse them of making
‘bad’ interpretations.”).
For discussions of statutory severability, see, for example, Michael C. Dorf, Facial Challenges to State and Federal Statutes, 46 STAN. L. REV. 235, 249–51 (1994); Richard H. Fallon, Jr.,
As-Applied and Facial Challenges and Third-Party Standing, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1321, 1349–51
(2000); John Copeland Nagle, Severability, 72 N.C. L. REV. 203(1993); Michael D.
Shumsky, Severability, Inseverability, and the Rule of Law, 41 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 227, 231–32
(2004); Kevin C. Walsh, Partial Unconstitutionality, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 738, 742–43 (2010);
cf. Scott A. Keller & Misha Tseytlin, Applying Constitutional Decision Rules Versus Invalidating
In Toto, 98 VA. L. REV. 301, 319 (2012) (arguing that commentators including Professor
Rosenkranz have erred by failing to distinguish “constitutional decision rules,” which determine whether statutes are constitutionally valid or invalid, from “invalidation rules,”
which determine whether the appropriate remedy for an invalid statute is severance or
total nullification”).
E.g., Brown v. Entm’t Merchants Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2738 (2011); Citizens United v.
Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 340 (2010); Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 505
(2005); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995); R.A.V. v. City of St.
Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 395 (1992).
Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Strict Judicial Scrutiny, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1267, 1268–75 (2007).
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strict scrutiny test survives—and I would say appropriately—as a welldesigned device for implementing otherwise vague constitutional
strictures that could not sensibly be treated as absolute, yet deserve
32
more protection than a balancing test afforded. It will not escape
attention that the strict scrutiny test, as currently employed, sometimes measures the constitutionality of legislation under constitutional provisions that do not have “Congress” as their grammatical sub33
jects.
Second, Rosenkranz’s reference point for ascertaining the meaning of the Constitution’s text and structure appears to be what is
34
sometimes described as its “original public meaning.” This is not a
necessary assumption for a textualist theorist to make. An avowed
textualist might, for example, eschew historical inquiries and focus
just on the Constitution’s text and grammar as they would present
themselves to twenty-first-century interpreters untutored in constitu35
tional history. Or one might assume that the Constitution’s text reflects aspirations that call for interpretation in light of moral princi36
ples. But I take Rosenkranz to want to interpret the Constitution’s
words and structure as they would have been understood by intelligent, grammatically adept, and informed members of the generation
that adopted relevant constitutional language. Rosenkranz’s linkage
of his textualism to a form of originalism emerges most clearly in his
discussion of the Fourteenth Amendment. He bases his conclusion
that the Privileges or Immunities Clause partially incorporates the Bill
of Rights almost entirely on evidence adduced by other scholars concerning the original public understanding of the Fourteenth
37
Amendment.
32
33

34

35

36
37

Id. at 1292.
E.g., Adarand, 515 U.S. at 227 (announcing that all racial classifications imposed by the
federal government are subject to strict scrutiny under the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause).
See, e.g., Vasan Kesavan & Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Interpretive Force of the Constitution’s
Secret Drafting History, 91 GEO. L.J. 1113, 1144–45 (2003) (“Original meaning . . . asks not
what the Framers or Ratifiers meant or understood subjectively, but what their words
would have meant objectively—how they would have been understood by an ordinary,
reasonably well-informed user of the language, in context, at the time, within the relevant
political community that adopted them.” (footnote omitted)).
See, e.g., Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REV.
204, 208–09 (1980) (discussing the possibility of divergence between the meaning of the
Constitution’s text when it was ratified and its meaning today).
See, e.g., JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM 14–16 (2011); RONALD DWORKIN,
FREEDOM’S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 1–38 (1996).
See Rosenkranz, supra note 2, at 1052 & n.259 (highlighting the scholarly consensus that
the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates aspects of the Bill of Rights against the states
through the Privileges or Immunities Clause).
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Third, Rosenkranz’s constitutional interpretive methodology appears to afford little, if any, role to post-ratification precedent or to
concerns about sound policy. Almost never does he discuss precedent as potentially relevant to how the Constitution should be interpreted today, even when he calls for sweeping revisions of current
doctrine, and he rarely alludes specifically to considerations of functional desirability. Although I agree with Rosenkranz that the Constitution’s text, structure, and history are important, I, like many others,
believe that other considerations, including precedent and conse38
quences, should also matter to constitutional adjudication. Settled
precedent should not be cast aside lightly. When there is a choice
between otherwise legally plausible arguments and interpretations,
39
considerations of normative desirability should affect the balance.
In the next three Parts of this Article, I shall follow the avenues of
inquiry that these three methodological assumptions respectively
suggest. I shall begin by questioning Rosenkranz’s assumption that
the meaning of constitutional language should necessarily determine
the structure of judicial review. Then, assuming for the sake of argument that the structure of judicial review should reflect the meaning of the provisions on which Rosenkranz rests his thesis, I identify
some respects in which more work would be required to give adequate support to his textual and historical arguments. Finally, I turn
to issues involving the pertinence of precedent and value- or policybased arguments to constitutional adjudication. Although I allude
briefly to the much mooted issue of whether and if so when precedent should trump what otherwise would be the clearly ascertainable
38

39

See, e.g., FALLON, IMPLEMENTING THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 28, at 45–55 (developing
a “typology of constitutional argument”); Fallon, supra note 27, at 1194–209 (discussing
various “kinds of factors that the Court characteristically and appropriately takes into account” in resolving constitutional matters). Even some originalists would make exceptions for to their otherwise originalist theories to continue to adhere to well-established
precedent. See, e.g., ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE
INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 411–12 (2012) (“The chief barrier against a wrenching
purge—by originalism or any other theory of interpretation—is the doctrine of stare
decisis.”).
My approach to constitutional theory and my defenses of the methodological commitments described in the text are “interpretive” in Professor Dworkin’s sense of the term.
See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 45–86 (1986) (characterizing “interpretive” theories
as reflecting interacting considerations of “fit” and normative attractiveness). For further
discussion of Dworkin’s approach to American constitutional practice, see Fallon, supra
note 27, at 1192 & n.11, 1231–37. Following Dworkin, I believe that a theory of interpretation of the Constitution of the United States should aspire to fit and rationalize the implicit rules and understandings that have evolved to structure interpretation of our particular Constitution—most of which was written in the eighteenth century—at this point
in constitutional history.
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constitutional meaning, I shall focus more on issues—which I believe
that Rosenkranz’s work raises—about the pertinence of precedent
and policy when evidence regarding the originally understood public
meaning is plausibly viewed as supporting dramatically novel conclusions, but is not clear-cut.
III. THE ROLE OF “IMPLEMENTING” DOCTRINES IN CONSTITUTIONAL
ADJUDICATION
Although Rosenkranz seems to regard it as beyond question that
the original public meaning of provisions empowering and restraining non-judicial branches of government should determine the structure of judicial review, that proposition is by no means self-evident.
For my own part, I believe—as even some originalists
40
acknowledge —that questions concerning how courts should implement the Constitution turn partly on considerations besides the
claims about the meaning of the provisions empowering and restraining government actors on which Rosenkranz entirely rests his case.
Above I gave two examples of judicially developed doctrines to implement the Constitution that lack clear foundations in the Constitution’s text or the original public meaning of particular constitutional
provisions. One involved modern severability doctrines, the other
strict judicial scrutiny.
As I shall explain more fully below,
Rosenkranz appears to reject the possibility of statutory severability
under constitutional provisions that have “Congress” as their grammatical subjects. And he plainly insists that statutes cannot be subjected to “facial” tests such as the strict judicial scrutiny test under
provisions that have the President or the courts as their objects.
In my view, if Rosenkranz’s thesis aims wholly to overthrow or substantially to displace doctrines such as these, then it would generate
unacceptable consequences, and his proposal to restructure constitutional litigation in light of the subjects and objects of the Constitution
should be rejected on that basis. Alternatively, if Rosenkranz were to
construe his theory as leaving a substantial scope for implementing
doctrines that are not strictly derivable from the Constitution’s text
and structure, and for severability doctrines in particular, then his
proposed restructuring of constitutional litigation would have relatively little practical bite. If there is a “Goldilocks” interpretation of
Rosenkranz’s thesis that constitutional meaning dictates the structure
of constitutional litigation in all cases—one under which it would be

40

See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
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neither too strong to be tolerable nor too weak to be interesting—
then it will take more work by Rosenkranz to show exactly what it is.
Or so I am presently inclined to believe. To develop this thesis, I will
look first at the cases that Rosenkranz says uniquely and necessarily
involve facial challenges, and then at those that he says are inherently
as applied, and see what would follow if his prescriptions were adopted. I shall then, finally, say a few words about the application of his
thesis in cases challenging actions by the states and their officials.
A. Separability Doctrine in First Amendment Litigation
With respect to challenges that Rosenkranz depicts as necessarily
facial, his thesis would be too strong if it allowed no room whatsoever
for separability by insisting that any statute with even a single invalid
application is therefore necessarily unconstitutional in toto. Imagine,
for example, that Congress enacts a multi-part revision of the tax
code. Although most parts of the statute do not affect the freedom of
speech in any way, assume that one provision (out of hundreds) provides for a special levy on the press. That provision, we may suppose,
41
violates the First Amendment. The question then is: does the statute stand or fall as a whole, or can the provision providing for a levy
on the press be severed from the rest, so that the remainder can
stand? Modern severability doctrine would clearly call for partial, rather than total, invalidation of the statute, with all but the flawed pro42
vision surviving.
So, I believe, would common sense.
If
Rosenkranz’s theory required a different result, then I would adjudge
it too strong. It would dictate a potentially grievously improvident
outcome—imagine vast chunks of the tax code being thrown out as
unconstitutional as tax day approached!—and for no particularly
good end.
The consequences of Rosenkranz’s position would be even
stronger, stranger, and less tolerable if it applies to cases in which legislation is enacted in the form of a multi-part package that spans a variety of topics. Suppose Congress enacts, and the President signs, a
bill that, in different sections, makes appropriations for the Defense
41
42

Cf. Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minn. Comm’r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 590
(1983) (invalidating a state tax that disproportionately burdened the press).
See, e.g., Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2608 (2012) (concluding
that although the Medicaid “portion of the Affordable Care Act violates the Constitution,” the remedy for that violation “does not require striking down other portions of the
Affordable Care Act”); Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 328–36
(2010) (considering the “facial” constitutionality of one section of a federal campaign finance statute without suggesting that other parts of the law might be invalid).
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Department, funds but also reduces benefits under an entitlement
program, and amends the tax code. If Rosenkranz would maintain
that a single provision that infringed the freedom of speech could
not be severed from the rest, then his stance would seem to me not
only disturbingly imprudent, but also bizarre.
As I noted above, however, I do not mean to press my objection
too strongly, for Rosenkranz might be able to qualify his thesis. He
might imaginably say, for example, that each provision of a multi-part
statute should count as a distinct law unto itself and that only the invalid provision should therefore be struck down, even though the
provisions were all packaged together and the vote on some of them
might have depended on the packaging. Admission of this foothold
for severability doctrine would weaken his thesis quite considerably,
however, and begin to undermine his claim that it would have sharp
practical implications.
Now consider a different example, designed to test whether a sensible approach to First Amendment litigation does not sometimes require recognition of the separability of statutory language even within
a single provision. Suppose Congress enacts a provision making it a
crime to ship in interstate commerce any material that is “obscene or
43
lewd.” Let us assume that the statute would be valid if it prohibited
the shipment only of “obscene” material but invalid if it prohibited
the shipment only of “lewd” material. Must the provision stand or fall
as a whole on the ground that it is all one law? Under modern severability doctrine, the prohibition against the shipment of “lewd” material would be struck down, but the prohibition against obscenity
44
would continue to stand. To me, this would seem the clearly most
sensible result. Indeed, as I shall explain below, I would think it potentially defensible, even on Rosenkranz’s preferred ground of textual meaning: it would be linguistically plausible to read the First
Amendment’s command that Congress may make “no
law . . . abridging the freedom of speech” to permit a distinction,
within a statute, between “law abridging the freedom of speech,”
which is thus invalid, and law that does not abridge the freedom of
speech and therefore can stand. If Rosenkranz’s theory will not per-

43
44

Cf. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 849 (1997) (addressing the constitutionality of a federal
statute restricting “obscene or indecent” speech on the Internet).
See id. at 883 (effectively striking the words “or indecent” from the statute while allowing
the rest to stand); see also Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Fact and Fiction about Facial Challenges, 99
CALIF. L. REV. 915, 955 (2011) (“[T]he Court will reject a facial challenge on severability
grounds if it can identify a relatively surgically precise way of curing the [constitutional]
defect . . . .”).
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mit this result, I would again conclude that it is “too strong.” The
theory would impose substantial costs—and arguably, quite gratuitously so, if severability is permitted in the hypothetical case of a multi-part statute, only one part of which trenches on the freedom of
speech.
Now, finally, consider a case in which modern separability doctrine would view some invalid statutory applications—as distinct from
45
bits of statutory text—as separable from valid ones. An example
might be a statute forbidding federal employees from participating in
46
federal election campaigns. Must it be either valid in toto or invalid
in toto? Once again, modern separability doctrine would allow invalid applications to be severed from valid ones, at least as long as the
47
statute is not substantially overbroad. By contrast, Rosenkranz quite
clearly wants to forbid severability in this kind of case. According to
him, statutes that are challenged under the First Amendment are ei48
ther valid or invalid on their faces, and here, I am assuming, there is
nothing that can be severed from the face of the statute.
Even in this kind of case, there are two interlocking difficulties
with Rosenkranz’s apparent stance toward severability doctrine that,
in conjunction, point to the conclusion that his position is unacceptably strong. First, the demand that statutes with some allegedly invalid applications must be judged without possibility of separability
would impose nearly impossible burdens on courts to specify exactly
what a statute means on the first occasion of its application. In order
to know whether a statute had even a single invalid application, a
court would need to be able to imagine—when the statute was first
challenged—every possible case to which it might, as a matter of stat49
utory construction, apply. To be sure, the implementing doctrines
that now structure constitutional adjudication require some effort by
45

46

47

48
49

See Fallon, supra note 44, at 928 n.48 (“The presumption of severability can apply both to
linguistically distinguishable bits of statutory text and to invalid applications of an otherwise undifferentiated statutory provision.”).
Cf. U.S. Civil Serv. Comm’n v. Nat’l Ass’n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 568–81 (1973)
(rejecting an anticipatory over breadth and vagueness challenge to the Hatch Act, which
forbade federal employees from taking an “active part in political management or in political campaign” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 7324(a)(2))).
See, e.g., United States v. Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union, 513 U.S. 454, 477–78 (1995) (finding a statute forbidding federal employees from speaking or writing invalid as applied to
lower-level employees, but noting that the rationale of the decision would not necessarily
apply to, and that the statute might be applied against, higher-level employees).
See Rosenkranz, supra note 1, at 1236 (“A challenge to an action . . . of Congress must be ‘facial.’”).
See Fallon, supra note 29, at 1330–31 (discussing the difficulty of specifying a statute’s
meaning in the absence of concrete examples to anchor the analysis).
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the courts to determine how broadly a statute extends to hypothetical
cases. To determine whether a statute is “substantially overbroad” or
“narrowly tailored” to a compelling interest, a court must make a
rough determination of the range of cases to which a challenged provision would extend. But a court need not decide in advance whether a statute would apply to every imaginable case that it might reach,
because a few invalid applications would not suffice to invalidate a
statute in toto. Second, at the conclusion of its effort to specify
whether a statute would apply to all imaginable cases that might generate questions about its reach, a court would potentially need to
hold the statute facially invalid on the basis of unlikely occurrences or
bizarre hypotheticals. This approach would require a vast departure
from traditional approaches to First Amendment litigation that have
50
made “substantial over breadth” a condition of facial invalidation.
The now prevailing approach to severability in First Amendment litigation has, on the whole, proved sensible in practice. In my view, a
court should hesitate long before adopting an approach with such
51
substantial practical drawbacks as Rosenkranz’s appears to have.
B. Doctrinal Tests That Structure Facial Challenges
Just as the meaning of the First Amendment should not dictate
the scrapping of separability doctrine (even if Rosenkranz were right
about the meaning of the First Amendment), neither should the
meaning of constitutional provisions that have the President or the
courts as their objects dictate that facial challenges are categorically
impossible under such provisions. Once again, implementing doc-

50

51

See, e.g., New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 769–73 (1982) (holding that a statute challenged as unconstitutionally overbroad under the First Amendment will not be invalidated on that ground unless it is “substantially overbroad”).
Even European constitutional courts that have the power to exercise “abstract review”—
that is, to make a preenforcement determination of a law’s constitutionality outside of
ordinary litigation between adverse parties—will often sever unconstitutional applications
of statutes and employ saving constructions and balancing tests in order to narrow the
range of future cases in which a law can be applied, rather than make all-or-nothing determinations of its validity. See Alec Stone Sweet, Why Europe Rejected American Judicial Review: And Why It May Not Matter, 101 MICH. L. REV. 2744, 2777–78 (2003) (highlighting
similarities between European abstract review and American facial challenges). Notably,
recent experience in France suggests that a system of pure abstract review is undesirable
insofar as courts cannot subsequently invalidate constitutionally troubling applications of
statutes that survive initial review. See Gerald L. Neuman, Anti-Ashwander: Constitutional
Litigation as a First Resort in France, 43 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 15, 18 (2010) (pointing out
that constitutional difficulties sometimes arise too late for review). Other countries avoid
this difficulty by supplementing abstract review with “concrete” review arising from ordinary litigation. Id.
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trines—including tests, such as the strict scrutiny formula, that can
frame facial challenges—have an important role to play that no strictly grammatical thesis could or should displace.
Just for the sake of argument, let us stipulate that Rosenkranz has
correctly identified the meaning of the provisions of the Bill of Rights
written in the passive voice: in nearly every case, they express prohibitions directed against the President and the courts, rather than
Congress. Even if we assume that many of the provisions of the Bill of
Rights have the President and the courts as their immediate objects,
this assumption would not answer the question of how courts should
approach cases in which the trigger for presidential or judicial action
would arise from a law enacted by Congress. To see why, imagine
that Congress enacts a law directing officials of the executive branch
to engage in allegedly unconstitutional action. For example, suppose
Congress passes a statute requiring the performance of a strip search
before any person of Middle Eastern descent is permitted to board an
airplane. Not wishing to submit to the indignity of a discriminatory
strip search, a person of Middle Eastern descent sues for an injunction.
In a case such as this, in which a statute furnishes the occasion
and motivation for executive or judicial action by purporting to compel it, what is at issue for all practical purposes is the validity of Congress’s statutory directive. And it seems to me only sensible that the
courts should be able to structure litigation, as they now do, in light
52
of the practical realities. Within the currently prevailing doctrinal
52

Rosenkranz defends the practical attractiveness of his approach by citing the case of United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), in which the Supreme Court found that congressionally authorized federal Sentencing Guidelines violated the Sixth Amendment as applied to some cases. “Having framed the issue this way, the Court then had no choice but
to embark upon an adventure in lawmaking by severance” that his approach would have
avoided, he argues. Rosenkranz, supra note 2, at 1048. With regard to Booker, the details
of the Court’s severability holding seem to me to be mistaken, largely for the reasons that
Justice John Paul Stevens advanced in a dissenting opinion in which he argued that the
statute should have been severed differently. See Booker, 543 U.S. at 272–73, 283 (Stevens,
J., dissenting in part). Yet the Court’s more basic decision to treat the challenge to the
federal Sentencing Guidelines as one that could potentially have resulted in facial invalidation seems to me to have been correct. Acting pursuant to powers that include the
Necessary and Proper Clause, Congress had purported to make the Sentencing Guidelines mandatory in every case to which they applied. In order to determine whether the
mandate could be applied to the Booker case, the Court had to reach conclusions about
the meaning of the Sixth Amendment that showed the extent to which the Guidelines
could and could not be applied to other cases. Thus far, I would say, the Court’s mode of
proceeding could not be faulted. Moreover, if the Court then went awry in its severability
analysis, then its case-specific error by no means shows the desirability of a wholesale
abandonment of severability doctrine. Among its other implications, such abandonment
could lead to improvident rulings that entire statutes are invalid based on provisions or
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framework, a court would ask whether a statute directing the President to discriminate on the basis of race or national origin is neces53
sary to promote a compelling governmental interest. If the court
applied that test, and if the statute failed it, then the conclusion
would follow that the statute was invalid on its face.
In resisting the conclusion that my hypothesized case involves a
properly facial challenge, Rosenkranz might choose either of two alternative lines of analysis. First, he might insist on overthrowing the
existing doctrinal structure by, for example, maintaining that a court
should simply ignore the law that Congress has enacted or, perhaps,
treat it as relevant only for establishing that a plaintiff of Middle Eastern descent was likely enough to be strip-searched to have standing to
sue. Under this approach, litigation would focus on the permissibility
of executive officials’ strip-searching of the particular parties to a particular lawsuit, not the permissibility of the discriminatory classification contained in the statute. The question would be whether the individual search was “unreasonable,” not whether the classification
54
violated equal protection. If Rosenkranz took this position, then his
thesis would seem to me to be “too strong.” In my judgment, an insistence that the courts could not address the permissibility of Congress’s directive would be objectionably obfuscatory and ultimately
dysfunctional because it would wash out of the case both the reason
that the threat of a strip search would seem real—namely, the hypothetical statutory directive—and one of the principal grounds for objection—namely, the mandated discrimination on the basis of race or
55
national origin.
More generally, Rosenkranz’s analysis would
threaten the use of many currently applicable doctrinal tests, including strict judicial scrutiny, to enforce any constitutional guarantee
that does not have “Congress” as its grammatical subject. If constitutional litigation could not focus on statutes in challenges to federal
action under provisions not having “Congress” as their subjects, then

53
54
55

applications that would now be deemed severable, as I have argued above. An argument
that attacks severability doctrine as applied to all cases is therefore too strong. And an argument that severability doctrine was misapplied in a particular case fails to establish the
need for a restructuring of constitutional adjudication that would eliminate severability
questions across the board.
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995).
U.S. CONST. amend. IV; e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968).
Insofar as the permissibility of race-based classifications would now occur under the Due
Process Clause, a further question would be whether Rosenkranz would tolerate the application of this branch of “substantive due process” at all. See Rosenkranz, supra note 2,
at 1042 (“[S]etting . . . substantive due process to one side, the object of the Due Process
Clause is not Congress, but the President.”).
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the occasions for litigation would multiply radically. It would be
much harder to establish that the rationale for a decision in one
case—for example, finding that it would be unreasonable to strip
search a particular person absent greater grounds for individualized
suspicion than her family heritage and any other currently known
facts supplied—would apply to another case. If so, the efficacy of the
courts as guarantors against governmental misconduct would diminish accordingly.
Eschewing this “too strong” position, Rosenkranz might alternatively maintain that his claim that most Bill-of-Rights-based challenges
are necessarily as-applied is a purely logical one, with few practical
ramifications: as a formal matter, the court can only inquire into
what the Executive can permissibly do, even if, as a practical matter,
the court must do so by applying a doctrinal test, such as the strict
scrutiny formula, that focuses on whether Congress had sufficient justification for enacting a statute purporting to require executive action
of a particular kind. If Rosenkranz’s thesis were construed in this
way, then a court could render opinions making it clear that statutes
prescribing unreasonable or discriminatory searches or cruel and
unusual punishment could not be applied to anyone under any circumstances, and those opinions would serve as controlling precedents in all future cases involving those statutes. But this position
would save Rosenkranz’s thesis only by making his claim that facial
challenges are impossible under constitutional provisions written in
the passive voice too weak to hold much interest.
One further potential anomaly of Rosenkranz’s position also bears
notice. Suppose now that Congress authorizes a federal executive
agency, subject to supervision by the President, to engage in rulemaking, and suppose further that the agency issues regulations that, if
enacted by Congress, would have been subject to facial challenge as
invalid under the First Amendment. Because the regulations were issued by an executive agency, are they subject only to an as-applied
challenge, even though they operate with the same force of law as
would a statute that would trigger, and indeed demand, a facial challenge? If so, then this odd consequence would heighten my sense
that Rosenkranz’s thesis proves too much.
C. Different Rules for Challenges to State and Federal Legislation?
In the articles that he has published to date, Professor Rosenkranz
has said relatively little about the structure of litigation challenging
state action and legislation under incorporated provisions of the Bill
of Rights. Once again, however, he would appear to confront a
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“Goldilocks” problem. Because most of the provisions of the Bill of
Rights apply against the states, and because the Fourteenth Amendment’s incorporating language has “no State” as its grammatical subject, Rosenkranz appears to contemplate that state legislatures can violate guarantees that, in their unincorporated form, apply only
against the President and the courts and that therefore would not
56
permit facial challenges to congressionally enacted legislation. If
constitutional adjudication were restructured in accordance with his
thesis, a state statute prescribing unconstitutional searches or cruel
and unusual punishments would thus be subject to a facial challenge,
whereas an identical federal statute would not. In the already confused doctrine governing the availability of facial challenges, the introduction of this distinction would predictably generate yet more
vexation and inconsistency. Alternatively, any interpretive complexity
that Rosenkranz might introduce to avoid this odd conclusion would
risk undermining the bold revisionism in which the attraction of his
thesis largely inheres.
The problem here—if such is the word—is a general one: the
more broadly a textual or historical thesis (such as Rosenkranz’s)
sweeps, the more likely it is to generate tension not only with settled
interpretations of constitutional language, but also with judicially established tests and mechanisms for implementing otherwise vague
language and historical understandings. Sometimes revisionary theses should undoubtedly be accepted. At the very least, however,
recognition of a distinction between constitutional interpretation and
constitutional implementation should cause one to think twice about
when theses about the historical meaning of constitutional language
should displace implementing devices—such as those reflected in
separability doctrine and the “strict judicial scrutiny” test—that find
their justifications more in functional than in purely linguistic or historical grounds in the first place.
IV. SOME QUESTIONS ABOUT THE CONSTITUTION’S ORIGINAL PUBLIC
MEANING
In arguing that the “subjects” and “objects” of constitutional provisions do not necessarily dictate the entire structure of judicial review, I have so far assumed that Professor Rosenkranz has accurately
identified the original public meanings of the various provisions on
which his thesis depends. But determining whether he has applied

56

See supra notes 21–24 and accompanying text.
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his own methodological assumptions correctly in all cases will also
pose some daunting challenges for those seeking to come fully to
grips with his claims. In so saying, I mean to tread cautiously. I am
neither a legal historian nor an accomplished practitioner of the art
of reasoning from “structure and relationship”—the phrase coined by
Charles Black to describe the interpretive methodology of discerning
the meaning of one constitutional provision through inferences con57
cerning its interconnections with others. Accordingly, I am unprepared to characterize Rosenkranz as having erred on any specific historical or linguistic point. Nevertheless, it is easy to identify instances
in which the cautious among us will want to await more evidence and
argument before making up our minds. Two examples will suffice to
illustrate the point.
One involves Rosenkranz’s largest claim, which is that the structure of judicial review that he champions emerges inexorably from
58
the Constitution’s grammar and original public meaning. Insofar as
this is a historical claim, assessment of its validity depends on an examination of how reasonable members of the Founding generation
would have understood the judicial role in constitutional cases. This
question has spurred the development of a large literature, marked
59
by myriad theories concerning the anticipated judicial role. According to some scholars, the historically predominant view was that
courts would invalidate legislation only in cases of clear mistake by
60
the legislature concerning the Constitution’s requirements. According to others, it was widely understood that all of the branches of
government would interpret the Constitution for themselves, with ju61
dicial interpretations enjoying no hierarchical “supremacy.” Before
embracing Professor Rosenkranz’s textually and historically based
conclusion that all First Amendment challenges are necessarily facial
challenges—to take just one particularly salient example—I would
57

58
59
60

61

See generally CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW (1969). Reasoning from structure and relationship can be difficult to execute persuasively. BOBBITT, supra note 27, at 84–85. Since Black himself, the most masterly practitioner of the art is Akhil Amar. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112 HARV. L.
REV. 747 (1999).
See Rosenkranz, supra note 1, at 1210 (“[C]areful attention to constitutional grammar can
reveal—and will reveal—nothing less than the structure of judicial review.”).
For a brief summary, see RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART & WECHSLER’S THE
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 70–72 (6th ed. 2009).
See, e.g., SYLVIA SNOWISS, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION 80 (1990);
Dean Alfange, Jr., Marbury v. Madison and Original Understandings of Judicial Review: In Defense of Traditional Wisdom, 1993 SUP. CT. REV. 329, 342–49.
E.g., LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND
JUDICIAL REVIEW 106–11 (2004).
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want to test it carefully against the complex, conflicted body of evidence bearing on Founding-era expectations concerning the judicial
role.
Without having purported to carry out the requisite inquiry, I
would call attention to one recent work of historical scholarship that
seems closely on point. In a study of historical understandings of
statutory severability, or the question whether invalid portions or applications of statutes can be severed from valid ones, Professor Kevin
Walsh argues that courts in the early nineteenth century declined to
enforce statutory provisions insofar as they were “repugnant” to the
Constitution, but took it for granted that challenged provisions oth62
erwise remained enforceable.
I do not know whether Walsh reviewed the relevant cases with Rosenkranz’s thesis in mind or whether
subsequent researchers might reach a different conclusion if they
parsed the data set to distinguish constitutional cases based on the
varied grammatical “subjects” of the diverse constitutional provisions
under which challenges were brought. Nevertheless, Walsh’s scholarship suggests that it is a historically open question whether constitutional provisions conferring powers and establishing restraints on
Congress and the President would have been understood to have the
implications for the structure of judicial review that Rosenkranz
claims.
A second example of a question meriting careful assessment involves Rosenkranz’s more specific claim about the precise prohibition
that the First Amendment embodies. As I construe his argument, he
believes that when the First Amendment prescribes that “Congress
shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech,” the term
“law” refers to the totality of any bill that Congress passes and the
63
President signs. To test this claim, let us begin by recalling two hypothetical statutes that I introduced earlier: one is a multi-part tax
statute, with just one provision that abridges the freedom of speech,
and the other is a prohibition against the shipment in interstate
commerce of any “obscene or lewd” material, under doctrinal rules
that permit the regulation of “obscenity” but not of lewd publications
that fall short of being obscene. Above I argued that even if these
statutes constituted laws abridging the freedom of speech, the grammatical structure of the First Amendment should not preclude sever-

62
63

Walsh, supra note 29, at 765–67.
See Rosenkranz, supra note 1, at 1236–37 (approvingly quoting Thomas Jefferson’s determination that a successful First Amendment challenge renders an “act of the Congress”
altogether void).
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ability doctrines that would uphold their valid parts. Now I want to
suggest a different possible objection to Rosenkranz’s thesis.
Although Rosenkranz seems to assume that the phrase “no law”
must refer to the entirety of any bill that Congress enacts and the
President signs, it would seem just as linguistically plausible to me to
conclude that insofar as my hypothesized statutes trench on “the
freedom of speech,” they constitute “law . . . abridging the freedom of
speech,” and thus are invalid, but that insofar as they do not abridge
the freedom of speech, they are “law that does not abridge the freedom of
speech” and can therefore stand. In other words, I would think it linguistically plausible, in light of the evident purpose of the First
Amendment to protect only utterances that lie within “the freedom
of speech,” to hold that the word “law” does not necessarily refer to
entire enactments, but can sometimes refer instead, more narrowly,
to the specific dictates or prohibitions that legislation establishes. In
short, purely as a twenty-first-century linguistic matter, it does not
seem to me to be absolutely necessary to conclude that a statutory
provision that has nothing to do with speech—as in the multi-part tax
statute that I hypothesized—is “law abridging the freedom of speech”
just because it is packaged with law that plainly does abridge the freedom of speech. If I am right that the language of the First Amendment does not necessarily dictate Rosenkranz’s conclusion, it would
be wiser, in my judgment, to follow the counsel of John Marshall that,
when a provision would permit both a provident and an improvident
interpretation, the more provident interpretation should be pre64
ferred.
So far, however, in discussing what the First Amendment does and
does not proscribe, I have talked only about twenty-first-century linguistic intuitions, not about the Amendment’s original public meaning. It is, of course, a distinct, historical question how informed, linguistically competent Americans of the Founding generation would
have understood the First Amendment’s application to cases involving statutes that overstep constitutional bounds in part, but only in
part. In reference to this question, to which I do not pretend to
know the answer, suffice it to say that Rosenkranz’s evidence seems
somewhat thin. Apart from noting that Thomas Jefferson pardoned
64

See M’Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 408 (1819) (“Is that construction of
the Constitution to be preferred which would render [government] operations difficult,
hazardous, and expensive? Can we adopt that construction (unless the words imperiously
require it,) which would impute to the framers of that instrument, when granting these
powers for the public good, the intention of impeding their exercise by withholding a
choice of means?”).
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65

all violators of the Alien and Sedition Acts, he offers almost no evidence concerning eighteenth- or early-nineteenth-century understandings. Not being an originalist, I would not necessarily regard
such evidence as determinative of how the Constitution ought to be
interpreted today, but I would, at least, think it relevant in assessing
whether Rosenkranz had established his thesis about the original
public meaning.
Imaginably, Rosenkranz might take exception to this assertion. As
I have said, I understand his theory to embody claims about the original public meaning of relevant constitutional provisions, not about
how members of the eighteenth-century public actually understood
them. This is a subtle but significant difference. Questions about
original public meaning are partly hypothetical: they ask how an intelligent, well-informed, grammatically adept person would have cor66
rectly understood the meaning of a provision. And the answers to
such questions will not necessarily depend on what members of the
Founding generation, who might have misapprehended the meaning
or proper application of the words of the First Amendment, actually
67
thought. At the very least, however, actual-eighteenth-century understandings would provide relevant evidence of what the words of
the First Amendment meant in their eighteenth-century context.
To summarize, although Rosenkranz’s historical and linguistic
claims appear plausible, and may indeed be correct, I do not think
that he has so far marshaled enough evidence to rule out all plausible
competing views about the implications of the Constitution’s text and
structure with respect to some highly salient points, notably including
the meaning of “no law” in the First Amendment.
V. THE PERTINENCE OF PRECEDENT AND PRUDENCE IN CASES OF
TEXTUAL AND HISTORICAL UNCERTAINTY
The final line of analysis that I wish to pursue involves the pertinence of judicial precedent and prudence in assessing not only
Rosenkranz’s theory, but also other similarly revisionary theories that
depend on claims about original constitutional meanings. To begin,
let us imagine that a litigant presses a constitutional claim that all
65
66

67

See, e.g., Rosenkranz, supra note 1, at 1235–38.
See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi & Julia T. Rickert, Originalism and Sex Discrimination, 90 TEX.
L. REV. 1 (2011) (distinguishing between the original meaning of the Equal Protection
Clause and original expectations concerning its application and arguing that its original
public meaning forbade sex-based discrimination that tended to subordinate women
even if most of the public did not so apprehend in 1868).
Id.
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agree cannot succeed unless she can persuade a court—let us suppose it is the Supreme Court—to embrace Professor Rosenkranz’s
thesis. For example, imagine that the litigant demands the total invalidation of a multi-part tax statute, only one provision of which
bears in any way on the freedom of speech. In considering what the
Court, or one of its Justices, ought to do in light of the arguments
and evidence that Rosenkranz has so far presented, let us put aside
my argument that courts should sometimes employ “implementing”
doctrines that are not dictated by the Constitution’s linguistic or historical meaning. We can assume, instead, that the question is solely
about how to interpret the phrase “no law” as it appears in the First
Amendment. On this assumption, the question becomes just how
persuasive would Rosenkranz’s arguments and evidence need to be to
justify a court in deciding a case on the basis of it.
In framing this question, I want to distinguish it from the question
that would arise if a court adjudged that Rosenkranz had decisively
proved his thesis. Even then, of course, it would remain debatable
whether stare decisis ought to prevail over the originally understood
linguistic implications of “the subjects of the Constitution.” In my
view, past judicial precedents permitting the severance of statutes
challenged on First Amendment grounds, coupled with the practical
costs of adopting Rosenkranz’s prescriptions, would probably justify a
68
deviation from the original textual meaning.
Some originalists
69
70
might agree, though others, of course, would not. But I shall not
dwell on this scenario because in the case of Rosenkranz’s thesis, as of
most original theses about the Constitution’s semantic and historical
meaning that are presented for the first time in the twenty-first century, the notion that there could be no significant uncertainty is almost
certainly unrealistic (even if it is theoretically imaginable).
I thus return to the question of what a judge ought to do with
Rosenkranz’s thesis if she thought it quite plausibly correct—let us
say fifty-one percent likely to be right—but not clearly proven. When

68

69
70

See generally Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Constitutional Precedent Viewed Through the Lens of Hartian
Positivist Jurisprudence, 86 N.C. L. REV. 1107 (2008) (defending the proposition that initially erroneous precedent should sometimes prevail over what otherwise would be the best
interpretation of the Constitution’s meaning).
See, e.g., SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 38, at 411–14 (embracing a role for stare decisis in
constitutional adjudication).
See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, Trumping Precedent with Original Meaning: Not as Radical as It
Sounds, 22 CONST. COMMENT. 257, 269 (2005) (maintaining that although originalism can
accord limited roles to stare decisis, “[w]here a determinate original meaning can be ascertained and is inconsistent with previous judicial decisions, these precedents should be
reversed and the original meaning adopted in their place”).
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this assumption is conjoined with others that I have made in framing
the issue, Rosenkranz’s theory presents a recurring problem or puzzle, but one that is rarely formulated in general terms. A large, provocative, and controversial literature debates the pertinence of original understandings or original public meanings to constitutional
adjudication, but most often on the assumption that original public
meanings are known. Too seldom discussed is the very real and
common problem of how judges should deal with textual and historical uncertainty, as presented when path-breaking scholarship presents plausible but not clearly demonstrated claims of textual meaning or historical truth.
In many cases, we know that members of the Founding generation
disagreed among themselves about the meaning or application of
constitutional language. James Madison famously said that because
the Constitution was vague in many respects, its meaning would need
71
to be “liquidated” through subsequent practice and precedent. But
the Framers could, and did, disagree, even in cases in which the contending parties did not acknowledge vagueness. Uncertain about
whether the Constitution would permit Congress to create a Bank of
the United States, George Washington—who had presided over the
Constitutional Convention—sought the advice of then-Secretary of
State Thomas Jefferson and then-Secretary of the Treasury Alexander
72
73
Hamilton. Jefferson answered no, Hamilton yes. To cite just one
more example, James Madison believed that Congress’s power to tax
74
and spend for the general welfare was limited to taxing and spending in connection with the exercise of other enumerated congres75
sional powers. Hamilton, by contrast, thought that Congress’s power was a more general one, confined only by the requirement that
76
exactions and outlays must aim to promote the general welfare.
The difficulty of generating reasonably determinate, demonstrably
true conclusions about the original public meaning of constitutional
language is surely not a reason to abandon the quest for historical
knowledge or to eschew reliance on close textual analysis as a consid71
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eration in constitutional adjudication. Nonetheless, an awareness of
the frequently provisional and uncertain character of even scrupulously developed textual and historical claims furnishes a ground for
concluding that it would be deeply misguided for the Supreme Court
to renounce existing doctrine and reach an otherwise improvident
conclusion whenever five Justices are provisionally persuaded by new
textual and historical scholarship. A theory that would base all decisions exclusively on what seems to be the best available textual and
historical evidence, even when that evidence is sketchy or mixed and
has not yet withstood the test of time, could easily produce an endless
process of doctrinal reformation and counter-reformation.
In my view, the uncertainty of the arguments and evidence supporting Rosenkranz’s thesis should thus be deemed highly pertinent.
As I have explained, I think that the language of the First Amendment would permit other readings. Simply as a policy matter, it
would seem imprudent to prescribe across the board that statutory
validity must always be an all-or-nothing matter under constitutional
provisions with Congress as their grammatical subject. And I would
therefore conclude that precedents establishing the possibility of
statutory severability, like many other entrenched precedents that
may be incompatible with the Constitution’s original understanding
or original public meaning, ought to be followed.
My interests here, however, are as much methodological as they
are immediately substantive. Whether one agrees or disagrees with
my policy judgments, Rosenkranz’s thesis seems to me to raise a clear,
potentially hard question about how ready courts should be to embrace radically revisionist theories that might reasonably be deemed
more likely than not to be true, but that certainly are not clearly established, in light of the currently adduced arguments and evidence.
Assuming that textual and historical claims can be more or less securely supported by evidence, I doubt that any algorithm could be
produced to specify exactly how well supported any particular claim
should have to be in order to justify an otherwise regrettable constitutional decision. I am very confident, however, that the essence of
good judging lies in good practical judgment. Although I do not
fault Professor Rosenkranz for failing to address the significance of
uncertainty and prudence in constitutional adjudication, I think
these considerations highly pertinent to how the courts should receive his theory.
Scholars have a different role. To those of us who teach Federal
Courts and Constitutional Law, Rosenkranz has presented a challenge that we cannot responsibly ignore.
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CONCLUSION
The Subjects of the Constitution and The Objects of the Constitution are
ingenious and provocative. They make a rich contribution to scholarly and historical debate. In this Article, I have tried to express my
admiration for Professor Rosenkranz’s contribution to ongoing
scholarly discussion, while at the same time advancing reasons for
skepticism about his largest theses, which awe me with their boldly
imaginative sweep.

